


Sp SM

**VII FIGHTER COMMAND
ON IWO JIMA**

—A STATISTICAL SUMMARY—

NO. 100-100000
✓ CO *1-14*
✓ EX *1-14*
✓ Adj *1-14*
S-1
S-2
S-3
S-4
Air Insp
Cml
Ord
Comm
Eng
Chap
SSO
Stat
Flt Sgt
Flt
OF



Prepared By Statistical Control Section

1 September 1945

CONTENTS

KEY PERSONNEL

Command and Staff, 15 August 1945	1
Fighter Groups	1
Air Service Groups	2
Miscellaneous Units	2

HISTORY OF VII FIGHTER COMMAND, Pearl Harbor Day to Cessation of Hostilities	3-6
--	-----

COMBAT OPERATIONS, The Iwo Operation	7-8
--	-----

VLR ACTIVITY

VLR Navigation	9
Summary of VLR Missions, April - August, 1945	10-12
Combat Box Score, Enemy Losses	13
VLR Operational Summary, 7 March - 14 August, 1945	14
Tabulation of VLR Mission Activity	15
Tabulation of Cumulative VLR Mission Activity	16
Tabulation of Cumulative VLR-Bonin-CAP-and-Miscellaneous Mission Activity	17
Percent of Enemy Aircraft Destroyed and Damaged as to Number Missing	18
VLR Missions - Ratio Enemy Aircraft Destroyed and Damaged to AAF Aircraft Destroyed and Damaged	19
Ratio Enemy Aircraft Destroyed and Damaged to AAF Aircraft Destroyed	19
Average Sorties per VLR Mission	20
VLR Sorties by Groups	21
Percent Sorties Abortive	21
Percent Non-Effective VLR Sorties by Reason	22
VLR Hours by Group	23
Percent Abortive Hours	23
Total Combat Hours Flown	24
Daily Average Combat Hours Flown	24
Ratio of Pilot Losses to Missions - Sorties - Hours	25
Total Combat Sorties Flown	26
Daily Average Combat Sorties Flown	26
Total Pilot Losses, 2 March - 14 August, 1945, P-51 and P-47 Type Aircraft	27
Cumulative Aircraft and Pilot Loss for Day Fighter Units, 7 March - 14 August, 1945	28
Total Gasoline Consumed per Fighter Flying Hour, 7 March - 15 August, 1945	29
Gasoline Consumed per Flying Hour by Type Aircraft, 7 March - 15 August, 1945	30

BONIN MISSION ACTIVITY

Neutralization of the Bonins	31
Tabulation of Bonin Mission Activity	32
Tabulation of Cumulative Bonin Mission Activity	33
Percent of Bonin Missions Flown by Groups	34
Bonin Missions, Total Hours Flown by Groups	35
Percent of Effective and Non-Effective Sorties	36
Average Sorties per Mission	37
Total Sorties Flown	38

C.A.P. ACTIVITY (DAY)

Tabulation of Day CAP Activity	39
Tabulation of Cumulative Day Combat Air Patrol Activity	40
Day CAP Sorties Flown	41
Average Daily CAP Sorties Flown	42
Day CAP Flying Time, 7 March - 20 August, 1945	43

C.A.P. ACTIVITY (NIGHT)

Photograph, P-61 Night Fighter	44
Tabulation of Cumulative Night Combat Air Patrol Activity	45
Tabulation of Night Combat Air Patrol Activity, 7 March - 20 August, 1945	46
Night Intruder Missions to Bonins	47
Total Enemy Losses	47
Total P-61 Plane and Crew Losses	47
P-61 Night CAP Sorties Flown, 7 March - 20 August, 1945	48

C.A.P. ACTIVITY (NIGHT) (Cont'd)

P-61 Cumulative Hour and Sortie Data	49
P-61 Night CAP Hours Flown	50
Tabulation of Miscellaneous Short Mission Activity	51
Tabulation of Cumulative Miscellaneous Short Missions Activity	52

UTILITIES

Photographs of Available Utilities	53
Supply and Maintenance (Narrative)	54-56
Daily Average Aircraft Assigned and Percent Operational by Month	57
Daily Average Percent of Aircraft Operational by Months (P-51 and P-47 Aircraft)	58
Photographic Highlights	59
Personnel	60
Assigned and Attached Strength By Month, 31 March - 2 August, 1945	61
Daily Average of Pilots Assigned and Available, P-51 and P-47	62
Total Battle and Non-Battle Casualties, 2 February - 15 August, 1945	63
Unpredictable Two (Photographs)	64

MISCELLANEOUS

Weather Problem	66
Percent VLR Missions Cancelled by Weather	67
VLR Effective vs. Non-Effective Missions Due to Weather	67
Air Sea Rescue	68-69
Air Sea Rescue Activities, Percent of Pilots Rescued	70
Aircraft Accidents	71
Total and Fatal Aircraft Accidents by Organization	72
Total Aircraft Accidents by all Hours Flown and Organization	73
Total Aircraft Accidents by Individual and Injury Sustained	74
Total Aircraft Accidents by Cause and Organization	74
Total Aircraft Accidents by Type of Accident and Organization	75
Total Aircraft Accidents by all Hours Flown and Type and Model of Aircraft Involved	75
Total Aircraft Accidents by Cause and Type and Model Aircraft	76
Total Aircraft Accidents by Aircraft Involved and Damage Sustained	76
Total Aircraft Accidents by Type of Mission and Organization	77
Total Aircraft Accidents by Type of Mission	77
Total Aircraft Accidents by Type of Aircraft and Model Aircraft	78
Aircraft Accidents - Miscellaneous Data	78

COMMAND AND STAFF

15 AUGUST 1945

Commanding General	Brig. Gen Ernest Moore
Chief of Staff	Col. Eugene P. Mussett
Deputy Chief of Staff	Col. Lawrence E. Cole
A-1	Lt. Col. Harold H. Hinds
Ass't. A-1	Maj. Aubrey J. Holmes
A-2	Col. Frederic H. Fairchild
Ass't. A-2	Maj. William F. Rhodes
A-3	Col. Kenneth P. Bergquist
Ass't. A-3	Col. Robert J. Rogers
A-4	Col. Samuel M. Smith
Ass't. A-4	Maj. J. Harry Jeanes
Adjutant General	Lt. Col. James F. Garber, Jr.
Ass't. Adjutant General	Capt. Edwin H. Badger, Jr.
Signal Officer	Maj. Tom A. Watson
Air Inspector	Maj. Willard B. Mannon
Ass't. Air Inspector	Maj. Bobby Sadler
Chemical Warfare Service Officer	Maj. Leslie L.C. Hanselt
Ass't. Chemical Warfare Service Officer	1st Lt. Samuel Koplowitz
Ordnance Officer	Maj. James S. Dickinson
Ass't. Ordnance Officer	Maj. Alfred J. Widman
Medical Officer	Col. L. Renter Braswell
Ass't. Medical Officer	Maj. Fred E. Murphy
Weather Officer	Maj. Erwin A. Rode
Ass't. Weather Officer	1st Lt. James Basmajian
Statistical Control Officer	Maj. Arthur Cassell
Ass't. Statistical Control Officer	1st Lt. James F. Slickman
10th Historical Unit Officer	Capt. William M. Gibson
Judge Advocate General Department	Maj. Charles D. Leist
Special Service Officer	Maj. Henry A. Johnson
Ass't. Special Service Officer	1st Lt. Albert L. Nixon
Information and Education Officer	Capt. Walton Manning
Commanding Officer, Hq. and Hq. Sqdn.	Capt. Stanley P. Mitchell

FIGHTER GROUPS

GROUP	GROUP COMMANDER	DEPUTY COMMANDER	EXECUTIVE OFFICER	SQDN.	SQUADRON COMMANDER
15th	Col. John W. Mitchell	Lt. Col. Elmer E. Booth	Lt. Col. Dean E. Mansfield	45th	Maj. Robert W. Moore
				47th	Maj. Theon E. Markham
				78th	Maj. James B. Tapp
21st	Col. Charles E. Taylor		Lt. Col. Russell S. Quaintance	46th	Maj. Robert L. McDonald
				72nd	Maj. James H. Carlyle
				531st	Maj. Harry C. Crim, Jr.
500th	Col. Bryan B. Harper	Lt. Col. Harley Brown	Lt. Col. Wendell L. Holsten	457th	Maj. Daun G. Anthony
				458th	Lt. Col. Harrison E. Shipman
				462nd	Maj. Thomas P. Dejarnette
414th	Col. Henry T. Thorne, Jr.	Lt. Col. Charles A. Gayle	Lt. Col. Lenos L. Pulner	413th	Maj. Paul R. Wipnall
				437th	Maj. John P. Brown, Jr.
				456th	Maj. James W. Bothwell

AIR SERVICE GROUPS

GROUP	GROUP COMMANDER	SQUADRON	SQUADRON COMMANDER
51st Air Service Group	Lt. Col. Waverly H. Jackson	Hq. and Base Service Squadron	Maj. Joseph W. Lane
		372nd Air Engineer Squadron	Maj. George W. Hoar
		583rd Air Materiel Squadron	Capt. Arthur H. Tones
		336th Station Complement Squadron	Maj. Joe C. Denton
52nd Air Service Group	Lt. Col. Henry L. Benson	Hq. and Base Service Squadron	Maj. Charles D. Sutton
		614th Air Engineer Squadron	Capt. Russell R. Smith
		621st Air Materiel Squadron	Capt. Palmer W. Larson
58th Air Service Group	Lt. Col. Kenneth E. Cook	Hq. and Base Service Squadron	Maj. Richard H. Feuille
		490th Air Engineer Squadron	Maj. John C. Head
		611th Air Materiel Squadron	Maj. E. Dean Sperry
		384th Aviation Squadron	Capt. Fred R. Fader
		335th Station Complement Squadron	Maj. Myrle J. Wolfe
55th Air Service Group	Lt. Col. James C. Badgett	Hq. and Base Service Squadron	Maj. John F. Reinhard
		985th Air Engineer Squadron	Maj. George W. Lovering, Jr.
		990th Air Materiel Squadron	Maj. Leland C. Huey
		465th Aviation Squadron	Capt. Frederick J. Byrod, Jr.
		334th Station Complement Squadron	Maj. Lawrence F. Rains

MISCELLANEOUS UNITS

UNIT	UNIT COMMANDER
549th Night Fighter Squadron	Lt. Col. Joseph E. Payne
811th Engineer Aviation Battalion	Maj. John H. Pope
568th Signal Aircraft Warning Bn.	Lt. Col. Henry R. Chamberlain
302nd Fighter Control Squadron	Maj. Joseph P. Bates
1914th Ordnance Company	Capt. Paul M. Haynes
9th Radar Calibration Detachment	Maj. Calvin C. Norwood
Det. 4th Emergency Rescue Detachment	Maj. Ivan K. Mays

HISTORY OF THE VII FIGHTER COMMAND

PEARL HARBOR DAY TO CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

The VII Fighter Command came into existence in 1940 as the 14th Pursuit Wing of the Hawaiian Air Force, constituted late in October and activated at Wheeler Field, Territory of Hawaii, 1 November 1940, with a strength of one officer and 25 enlisted men. Its first Commanding General, then Brigadier General Howard C. Davidson, was also in command of Wheeler Field. Late in October, 1941, the command included in its tactical units two pursuit groups, the 15th, with the 45th, 46th and 47th Squadrons; the 18th, with the 6th, 19th, 44th, 72nd and 78th Squadrons; and the 73rd Pursuit Squadron directly under the 14th Pursuit Wing.

On December 7, 1941, the direct predecessor of the VII Fighter Command, like other Army and Navy units on Oahu, suffered seriously in the Japanese attack. But it also inflicted the first damage and casualties on the enemy in World War II, shooting down 12 of the total of 29 Jap planes destroyed on that day. An immediate consequence of 7 December was the coordination of all defense units: the Aircraft Warning Regiment, Hawaii, the 53rd Coast Artillery Brigade (AA), and all shore-based Navy and Marine fighter aircraft were placed under the control of the commanding general of the wing, redesignated the 7th Interceptor Command 10 days after Pearl Harbor. The mission of the command became the defense of the Hawaiian group and, scarcely less important, training fighter pilots in the difficult skills of interception and navigation in the enormous Pacific Ocean areas, to be sent "down under" to the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces at the rate of 25 trained pilots a month. The command was hard pressed to supply replacements for the South and Southwest Pacific areas in 1942 and 1943. The constant drain upon its best pilots tended to weaken its strength, but commitments were met.

In May 1942 the 7th Interceptor Command was redesignated the VII Fighter Command, and in June began the first period of its operations in forward areas. By October 1942, General Davidson had taken over a new post in India, command of the Tenth Air Force, and Brigadier General Robert W. Douglass Jr. assumed command of the Fighter Command. The objectives of the Fighter Command in this period were to aid in the holding of Midway, and to defend Canton and Christmas Islands from possible Japanese attack and seizure. It was imperative to hold the Hawaiian Island's outpost and to guard the communications to Australia. The 73rd Fighter Squadron moved its P-40s to Midway Islands by carrier in June 1942, and in January 1943 flew them back to Kaneohe Naval Air Station on Oahu, completing the longest overwater mass flight of single-engine army fighter planes in aviation history. The months from June 1942 through November 1943, for many of the units of the Command, constituted a phase of

combined defense and intense preparation for combat, on Hawaii and Kauai, and at Canton, Christmas, and Midway.

As a consequence of the offensive operation, 13 November 1943 through 6 December 1943, in which Tarawa, Apemama, and Makin were stormed, occupied, and developed, bases became available for strikes in support of moves against Kwajalein, Majuro, and Eniwetok. The mission of VII Fighter Command units participating in the assault of the Marshalls was to deny Mille and Jaluit as air bases to the enemy and to maintain neutralization of these bases thereafter. The first missions were flown on December 18, 1943, and the last on March 10, 1944, and included reconnaissance, rescue, interception, leaflet, strafing, and dive-bombing strikes. The most important mission flown during this period resulted in the destruction of 10 Japanese fighter planes, and three probably destroyed, on 26 January 1944, when the enemy aircraft were caught in an ambush attack as they were pursuing a B-25 formation withdrawing from the target.

By March 1944, the units of the VII Fighter Command were pulled back to Oahu for regrouping, reinforcement, training with new planes, and general reorganization in anticipation of the Marianas operation. General Douglas in May 1944 assumed control of the Seventh Air Force and his deputy commander, Brigadier General (then Colonel) Ernest Moore, became commander of the VII Fighter Command, and directed it during the period of the Marianas operations. This expansion of the VII Fighter Command, then, led up to the Marianas operation, in which the objectives were to occupy and defend Saipan, Tinian, and Guam. The mission of the Fighter Command units involved was direct support of ground troops, and neutralization of airdromes to prevent enemy air action or landings, with the further mission of interception and defense against air attack. The 318th Group Headquarters and the 19th and 73d Fighter Squadrons moved into Isely Field on Saipan on June 22, D-day plus six, flying their first mission the same day. Other units of the VII Fighter Command that took part in this operation were the 333d Fighter Squadron and the 599th Signal Aircraft Warning Company. Operating with the 318th Fighter Group was the 6th Night Fighter Squadron, and Fighter Command thus achieved the distinction of having the first fighters and night-fighters in the Marianas.

From the newly won bases in the Marianas, Fighter Command units recorded two more important events in the history of fighter aircraft in the Pacific theatre. On October 21, 1944, VII Bomber Command Liberators for the first time in the history of their operations attacked an enemy target with benefit of fighter escort. Twenty P-47s took off on the first landbased fighter escort - 1500 miles against Iwo Jima from Saipan - carrying approximately 735 gallons of fuel, using 2 165-gallon wing tanks, and 305-gallon fuselage tank. Each plane carried 1600 to 1800 rounds of ammunition. Five of the fighters jointly claimed one twin-engined Jap plane, Irving. The fighters saw 3 or 4 single-engine Japanese planes but there was no contact as the enemy did not follow the bombers out.

Thus, on 21 October 1944, the P-47 aircraft of the 318th Fighter Group had flown the first long range escort for B-24s of the VII Bomber Command in the Central Pacific, but it had been escort in the sense of rendezvous with the bombers just short of the target at Minami Iwo Jima, as the bombers were returning. On 22 November was the first long range escort mission over the target, with a mission to Truk, 1400 miles to and from Saipan, escorting 26 B-24s. Twenty-five P-38s took the bombers into the target and destroyed four Zekes. With the accomplishment of these two long range escort missions from the Marianas, VII Fighter Command had initiated a fighter technique that was to come to a climax in the following year when Fighter Command's P-51s from Iwo Jima returned again and again to harass the heart of the Japanese empire on both long range escort and fighter strike missions. In September of 1944 the 15th Fighter Group and the 598th Signal Aircraft Warning Battalion were prepared for an anticipated operation against Yap, and were assigned to Army Garrison Force APO 248. However, because the operation against Yap was scrubbed, the 15th Fighter Group stayed on Oahu, and was assigned to Army Garrison Force APO 86 for the later operation against Iwo Jima. However, the 598th Signal AW Battalion already on the high seas moved out, and took part in the invasion of the Philippines.

From October 1944 through January 1945 the Commanding General VII Fighter Command and his staff faced the problems of planning and preparing to move an entire fighter command to Iwo Jima, 4500 miles from Oahu, while the Navy and Marines still had the island under siege, and to be prepared, at the earliest possible date, to escort B-29s from the Marianas in missions against the industrial cities of Honshu.

Besides the numerous problems that confront a command moving intact to a forward area, VII Fighter Command had several new problems peculiar to VLR fighter operations. The initial difficulty was the lack of precedent for very long range fighter operations where the radius of action was well over 700 miles and all flying was over water. Planning had to be based largely on assumptions that later in actual operations proved sound. A second factor was the unfamiliarity of Fighter Command personnel with an aircraft new to the command, the P-51D-20. Other problems as complex in nature were the need for a suitable method of navigating fighters to and from the target, and a comprehensive and well organized system of air-sea rescue extending to the Japanese coast.

Iwo Jima was officially declared secured March 16, Marine Corps artillery firing ceased, and enemy organized resistance apparently had been broken. However, at the critical juncture between Marine withdrawal and infantry arrival, a portion of the enemy remaining in pockets of the north and northwest area of the island attacked the bivouac areas of the 21st Fighter Group, the 549th Night Fighter Squadron, the 465th Aviation Squadron, and the 726th Signal Aircraft Warning Company. Stated in the Japanese Field Order their mission was to "attack

the enemy on the Western Beach parallel to Chidori Airfield" and "to fight courageously to the end, sacrificing your lives for your country." VII Fighter Command units bore the brunt of the attack and their casualties numbered 14 killed and 50 wounded in the 21st Fighter Group, 2 killed and 2 wounded in the 726th Signal AW Company, 22 killed and 17 wounded in the 465th Aviation Squadron, and 6 killed and 19 wounded in the 549th Night Fighter Squadron - 44 officers and enlisted men killed in action, and 88 wounded, a total of 132 casualties.

On 7 April 1945, twenty-four days after Iwo Jima was declared secure, the first escort mission was flown when the 73rd Wing of the XXI Bomber Command attacked the Nakajima Aircraft Engine Plant in Tokyo. About 80 P-51s of the 21st and 15th Fighter Groups staged from Iwo Jima and met the bombers over the coast of Japan after the longest over-water escort flight then on record. On this mission P-51s attacked enemy fighters only when they threatened the bombers, but still scored 21 enemy fighters confirmed, 6 probable and 10 damaged. Nine days later, 16 April 1945, 79 P-51s of VII Fighter Command were over the target to conduct the first land-based fighter strike against the empire. The fighters attacked airborne and grounded aircraft, and airfield installations in the Kanoya area. There were no enemy aircraft sighted until after retirement when several were seen at a distance too far to follow or attack. On 19 April 1945 104 P-51s of the VII Fighter Command were airborne on a fighter sweep against Atsugi airfield on Honshu. This mission was the most effective mission in terms of enemy destroyed of all the missions flown by the command. The P-51s destroyed 27 enemy fighters and damaged three in the air, destroyed 14 and damaged 43 on the ground for the grand total of 87 enemy planes destroyed or damaged.

Fighter escort of XXI Bomber Command's B-29 strikes against the empire reduced bomber losses, and the number of enemy fighters rising to intercept the B-29s markedly declined. Thus the mission of VII Fighter Command tended toward fighter strikes and of the total of 51 VLR missions flown 39 were fighter strikes. Opposition of enemy fighters to the P-51s was not generally aggressive, however, fighter strikes allowed the command's fighters to search out Japanese aircraft and destroy them, proving far more destructive to the enemy's air arm.

From 7 April 1945 through 14 August 1945, date of the last VLR mission, VII Fighter Command conducted 51 VLR missions of which 41 were effective and 10 were non-effective missions. The command had 4172 effective sorties over the empire, destroyed or damaged 1062 Japanese aircraft, and lost only 114 P-51s due to combat action.

COMBAT OPERATIONS

COMBAT OPERATIONS

The Iwo Operation

This book, other than the brief history of the preceding section, is devoted to the accomplishments of the Fighter Command on Iwo Jima. All statistics concerning VLM missions commence on 7 April 1945, the day of the first mission, and are cut off on 14 August 1945, when the last combat mission of the war was flown against Japan. Data which involves Bonins missions, Combat Air Patrol, and other miscellaneous items begins on 7 March 1945 and is cut off on 20 August 1945.

COMMENCEMENT OF OPERATIONS BY TACTICAL UNITS

15th Fighter Group (P-51)	7 March 1945
21st Fighter Group (P-51)	24 March 1945
506th Fighter Group (P-51)	16 May 1945
414th Fighter Group (P-47N)	29 July 1945
548th Night Ftr Sq (P-61)	7 March 1945-ended 8 May 45
549th Night Ftr Sq (P-61)	22 March 1945

Comparative statistics should be interpreted in accordance with the date of arrival of tactical units. For example, the difference in sorties flown for any group is proportioned by the number of days the group was present on Iwo within that month. Comparative ratios, of course, are nevertheless obtainable irrespective of time spent on Iwo by a tactical organization within any month or period.

VLR NAVIGATION

Overwater navigation in single engine VLR fighter aircraft became a very serious problem when the VII Fighter Command was assigned the task of flying the 750 statute miles of the Pacific between Iwo Jima and its targets in south central Honshu.

The use of precision navigation instruments in a single seater being impractical, the Fighter Command was dependant on B-29 escort aircraft equipped with radio homing devices to get them to the Japanese Empire and after the fighters fulfilled their mission to return them to Iwo Jima. The fighters took off from base in groups of approximately fifty airplanes to rendezvous with the two B-29 escort planes at Kita Jima, an island forty miles north of Iwo. The B-29's, each having two rated navigators constantly on the alert, lead the fighters to a Departure Point along the Japanese coast from which point the smaller aircraft proceeded to either strafe and fire rockets into airfields and installations or to provide umbrella cover for B-29 Bombers attacking targets with demolition or fire bombs. Navigation over the Japanese Empire involved simple dead reckoning and visual which gave the pilots little trouble in finding their targets. Coming off the target to rally with the B-29 escort aircraft a plane to plane homing device, which originated in the VII Fighter Command, was used to assemble the fighters again for the trip home. On many missions haze and bad weather over the target caused the flights to become separated and a point about ten miles off the coast proved the most satisfactory reassembling area. Along the route returning to Iwo Jima the coordinated Navy - Army Air Sea Rescue service would establish five or six stations which were composed of a surface vessel, either submarine or destroyer, and an airborne Dumbo circling overhead. If any fighter pilots discovered damage to their airplanes and found they would be unable to make it home, vectors were provided to the closest rescue station and 100 percent pick-ups resulted in cases of this sort. Headwinds were occasionally encountered on the return trip and upon such occasions fuel consumption had to be watched carefully. In most cases, however, the wind would be from the Northwest and this would shorten the return for the tired pilots.

Weather in a number of cases complicated the navigation assignment and careful weather briefing was necessary. It was customary to have a B-29 fly approximately one hundred miles ahead of the main force going to the target in order that word could be passed back on VHF giving the large force warning and sufficient time to climb over any weather encountered or if necessary fly around it or under it. This factor and the use of a B-24 weather airplane flying the route six to ten hours prior to scheduled take off helped immeasurably in solving the bad weather problem.

IT'S ALL ABOUT COLAND

DATE	MISS. NO.	TYPE OF MISSION	GROUPS PARTICIPATING	TARGET	EFF vs. NON-EFF	EFF AIRCRAFT		ENEMY LOSSES						ACFT LOST		ACFT INVT		PILOTS LST	REMARKS
						EFF	NON-EFF	TOT	NON-EFF	DST IN AIR	PRCE IN AIR	DST ON GROUND	DAMAGED ON GROUND	TOT DIED OR DIED	COM OTH TOT	COM OTH TOT	COM OTH TOT		
7 April	77	Escort	15-21	Tokyo Area	Eff	91	28	119	21	6	6			33	2	2	3		
12 April	109	Escort	15-21	Tokyo Area	Eff	110	38	148	15	6	3			24	4	2	1	2	4
16 April	118	Strike	15-21	Kanoya	Eff	57	51	108							4	3	1	1	2
19 April	126	Strike	15-21	Atsugi-Yokasuga	Eff	106	20	126	24	3	3	14	40	81	2	2	2	2	2
22 April	130	Strike	15-21	Akenogahara & Susuka	Eff	99	24	123	10		15	29	54		2	2	2	2	2
26 April	132	Escort	15-21	Kobebu	Eff	91	31	122							6	6	1	1	6
30 April	134	Escort	15-21	Tachikawa	Non-eff	8	113	121							1	1	2	1	2
TOT APRIL	7	Escort 4 Strike 3	15th-7 21st-7		Eff-6 Non-eff-1	562	305	867	70	12	12	29	69	192	21	6	27	7	3
8 May	138	Strike	15-21	Kisarazu	Eff	94	26	120				2	6	8	2	2	4	1	5
17 May	144	Strike	21	Atsugi	Eff	41	23	64				10	49	59	4	2	6	2	4
19 May	146	Escort	15-21	Tachikawa	Non-eff	0	124	124											
24 May	151	Strike	15-21	Matsuro & Tokorozawa	Non-eff	0	120	120											
25 May	152	Strike	15-21	Matsuro & Tokorozawa	Eff	73	55	128	8	2		20	29	59	2	1	3	2	1
28 May	161	Strike	506	Kasumigaura	Eff	53	10	63	1			6	43	50	1	1	2	1	1
29 May	163	Escort	15-21	Yokohama	Eff	101	21	122	26	9	23			58	2	2	4	5	2
TOT MAY	7	Escort 2 Strike 5	15th-5 506-1 21st-6		Eff-5 Non-eff-2	362	379	741	35	9	25	38	127	234	11	6	17	14	5
1 June	167	Escort	15-21-506	Osaka	Non-eff	27	157	184	1					1	24	4	28	1	3
7 June	174	Escort	15-21-506	Osaka	Eff	140	29	169	2		2			4		2	2		
8 June	175	Strike	15-506	Kagamigahara & Meiji	Non-eff	0	118	118											
9 June	177	Strike	21	Kagamigahara	Eff	57	3	60											
10 June	180	Escort	15-506	Tokyo Area	Eff	107	11	118	26	6	11			27	2	1	3	2	2
11 June	181	Strike	21	Tokorozawa	Eff	56	7	63	1					43					
15 June	188	Escort	15-506	Osaka	Non-eff	1	122	123						56					
19 June	194	Strike	15-506	Kagamigahara & Meiji	Non-eff	0	96	96							1	1	1	1	1
23 June	202	Strike	15-506	Kagamigahara & Hyakuriga-hara	Eff	99	19	118	19	15	15	21	32	102	3	3	3	3	1
26 June	206	Escort	15-21-506	Honshu, Nagoya, Kobe & Osaka	Eff	145	29	174	2		3			5			1	1	1
27 June	208	Strike	15-21-506	Kasumigaura, TeikubadImba	Non-eff	0	158	158											
TOT JUNE	11	Escort-5 Strike-6	15-9 506-9 21-6		Eff-6 Non-eff-5	632	749	1381	51	22	33	47	95	238	29	11	40	14	6

VII FIGHTER COMMAND
SUMMARY OF VLR MISSIONS - 1945

DATE	MISS. TYPE OF NO.	GROUPS PARTICIPATING	TARGET	EFF U NON-EFF	ACTY AIRBORNE		DEATH IN AIR	BOMB LOSS		DAMAGED ON GROUND	TOT DEATH OR DIED	ACTY LOST		ACTY DIED	PILOTS LST	REMARKS
					EFF	TOT		PROB IN AIR	IN AIR	ON GROUND		COLL	OTH	COLL	OTH	
1 July	215	Strike 15-21-506	Kasumigaura, Itami, Honshu, Hamamatsu, & Susuka	Eff	84	92	176	3		3	7	3	3	3	4	17 Planes of 15th & 50 Planes of 506th weathered out
4 July	217	Strike 15-21-506	Imbe, Kasumigaura, Tsukuba, Naval Base (Yokosuka)	Eff	161	17	178	1		10	22	1	1	7	1	
5 July	218	Strike 15-506	Shimodate, Yatabe, Yawata, Asahi & Naruta	Eff	103	20	123			5	10			2		
6 July	220	Strike 21-506	Kumagaya, Narimasu, Kat-ori, & Yachinata	Eff	112	11	123	1	4	7	19	1	1	8	1	Weather-3 planes escorted each aborts back
7 July	222	Strike 15-21	Narimasu, Chofu, Kiryu, & Kumagaya	Non-eff	3	112	115									
8 July	224	Strike 15-506	Hyakurigahara, Yachinata, Tokorozawa & Chofu	Eff	114	7	121	5	1	25	17	7	1	11	4	
9 July	226	Strike 21-506	Itami, Nishinomiya, Hamamatsu & Toyohashi	Eff	110	12	122	12	4	10	31	1	1	7	1	
10 July	228	Strike 15-21	Hanashin, Sano, Nishinomiya & Tokoshima	Eff	103	6	109	1		13	5	3	3	11	1	
14 July	230	Strike 15-506	Meiji, Kasumigahara	Non-eff	2	113	115									Weather-2 Planes escorted each aborts back
15 July	233	Strike 15-21	Meiji, Kawa, Kasumigahara, Nagoya, Akenogahara & Suzuka	Eff	105	12	117	4	1	2	18	3	3	6	3	
16 July	235	Strike 21-506	Kiyosu, Komaki, Okazaki, Akenogahara, Suzuka & Kanayama	Eff	103	13	116	22	2	19	43	1	1	3	1	
19 July	237	Strike 15-506	Kasumigahara, Nagoya, Meiji, Itami, Nishinomiya, & Hanashin	Eff	92	26	118	9	1		7	1	1	1	2	17 Planes of 15th & 1 Plane of 506th failed to rendezvous
20 July	240	Strike 15-21	Meiji, Okazaki, Kamezaki, Kasumigahara, Komaki, Nagoya & Hamamatsu	Eff	96	19	115			2	10	2	1	3	2	21st Weathered in-hit Hamamatsu as Tgt of Opportunity
22 July	243	Strike 21-506	Itami, Hanashin, Sano, Takamatsu, Tokoshima, Hirato Suruga Bay	Eff	110	12	122	1		1	2	1	1	5	5	506th Hit shipping Inland Sea instead of designated target
24 July	245	Strike 15-21-506	Mikotogahara, Hamamatsu, Suruga Bay	Eff	91	58	149				6	1	1	2	1	15th Aborted due to weather
28 July	246	Strike 15-21-506	Tsukuba, Hyakurigahara, Mobar, Kumagaya, Chofu, Seizami, Shimodate, Yatabe, & Kizakazu	Eff	146	8	154		3		14	5	2	8	3	
30 July	248	Strike 15-21-506	Hanashin, Tamaichi, Sano, Kami, Nishinomiya, Osaka, Mirato, Kakogawa & Himeji	Eff	142	14	156					3	2	5	3	
TOT JULY	17	Strike 15-13 21-13 506-13		Eff-1677 15 Non-eff-2	552		2229	59	9	37	88	24	14	42	85	7 92 19 2 21

VIETNAM AIR COMMAND
SUMMARY OF MISSIONS - 1945


DATE	MISS NO.	TYPE OF MISSION	GROUPS PARTICIPATING	REMARKS	ACFT AIRBORNE		DEST IN AIR	ENEMY LOSSES		ACFT LOST		ACFT DIED		PILOTS LST		REMARKS							
					EFF	NON-EFF		PROB DEST/HAZED IN AIR	DEST IN AIR	ON GND OR DMR	COM	OTH	COM	OTH	COM		OTH						
1 August	250	Strike	21-414	Itami, Nishinomiya, Akasaka, Okazaki, Nagoya, & Toyohashi	Eff	39	40	79			3	1	4	4	1	5	3	1	4	29 Planes of 21st & 4 of 414th weathered out			
2 August	249	Strike	15-21-506	Kiyosu, Komaki, Okazaki, Himeji, Itami, Hanshin, Suzuka, Akenogahara, Kanayama	Eff	151	12	163	1	2	3			14	1	15							
3 August	251	Strike	15-506	Tsukuba, Hyakurigahara, Yatabe, Kumagaya, Chofu, & Atsugi	Eff	97	13	110	2	1	6	5	1	6	10	3	3						
5 August	254	Strike	21-506	Katori, Kamigaura, Imba, Atsugi, Tachikawa, & Tokorozawa	Eff	106	7	113	3	1	4	3	3	3	3	2	2						
6 August	255	Strike	15-21	Kumagaya, Takahagi, Sagami, Kamigaura, Kashima, & Shinjoh	Eff	98	7	105	4	21	25	5	2	7	5	5	2	1	3				
7 August	257	Escort Strike	15-506	Toyokawa Arsenal, Chofu, Sagami, Atsugi	Eff	99	8	107				1	1										
8 August	258	Strike	21-414	Hanshin, Tachikawa, Sano, Takatsu, Minato, Tokushima	Eff	78	4	82				5	1	6	4	4	2	2					
10 August	259	Escort	15-506	Tokyo Area	Eff	102	11	113	1	11	18			1	1	1							
14 August	261	Escort Strike	21-506 15-414	Osaka, Kiyosu, Komaki, Nagoya, Akenogahara, Suzuka & Kanayama	Eff	169	17	186	2	2	2	4	4	4	4	4	1	1					
TOT AUGUST	9	Escort 3 Strike 15-6 21-6			Eff 9	939	119	1058	6	3	70	25	6	31	45	2	47	13	2	15			
*GRAND TOT	51	Escort 15-40 21-38 Strike 15-29 39			Eff 41 Non-eff 10	4172	2104	6276	221	55	1119	219	448	1062	114	43	157	165	25	190	81	10	91

MISSIONS TO TRUK PERFORMED BY ALLTH GROUP FROM TINIAN AND GUAM

13 July	Strike	414th	Moan Airfield, Truk	Eff	8	1	9								2				
22 July	Strike	414th	Moan Airfield, Truk	Eff	22	2	24					1	1	2		1	1	1	
TOTAL					30	3	33					1	1	2	2	2	1	1	

*A TOTAL OF 51 VLR MISSIONS WERE FLOWN. HOWEVER, ON 7 AND 14 AUGUST ESCORT AND STRIKE MISSIONS WERE FLOWN ON EACH DAY AS PART OF THE MISSION FOR THAT DAY.

VII FIGHTER COMMAND COMBAT BOX SCORE ENEMY LOSSES


1069
**TOTAL
ENEMY LOSSES**

A I R	DESTROYED	225
	PROBABLES	56
	DAMAGED	119
G R O U N D	DESTROYED	219
	DAMAGED	450

		15 FTR GP	21 FTR GP	506 FTR GP	414 FTR GP	548 NF SQ	549 NF SQ
A I R	DESTROYED	105	78	38	1	2	1
	PROBABLES	32	12	11	0	1	0
	DAMAGED	54	40	25	0	0	0
G R O U N D	DESTROYED	90	95	34	0	0	0
	DAMAGED	100	249	101	0	0	0
	TOTAL	381	474	209	1	3	1

— VII FIGHTER COMMAND —
 — VLR OPERATIONAL SUMMARY —
 — 7 MARCH - 14 AUGUST 1945 —

COST

DESTROYED A/C	157
DAMAGED A/C	<u>190</u>
TOTAL	347
PILOT LOSSES	91
50 CAL. EXPENDED	2,277,090
GALS. OF GASOLINE	2,291,565
ROCKETS EXPENDED	1,873
WING TANK EXPENDED	9,907

RESULTS

A/C (AIR)	
DESTROYED	221
PROBABLES	55
DAMAGED	119
A/C (GROUND)	
DESTROYED	219
DAMAGED	<u>448</u>
TOTAL	1062

SUNDRY DESTRUCTION
AND DAMAGE

SURFACE VESSELS	254
LOCOMOTIVES	134
RAILROAD CARS	355
BUILDINGS & HANGERS	246
RADIO & RADAR STATIONS	16
OIL TANKS	10
TRUCKS	13

NOTE:

1. P-61 ACTIVITIES NOT INCLUDED.
2. AAF PILOT LOSSES INCLUDE ALL CASUALTIES INCIDENTAL TO VLR MISSIONS.

TABULATION OF VLR MISSION ACTIVITY

	UNIT	EFFECTIVE SORTIES	NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIES	TOTAL SORTIES	TOTAL MISSIONS	TOTAL HOURS	AV SORTIES PER MISSION	AV HOURS PER SORTIE	AV HOURS PER EFF SORTIE	AV HOURS PER NONEFF SORTIE	% TOTAL SORTIES PER NONEFF SORTIE	AMMUNITION EXPENDED	ROCKETS EXPENDED
APR	15th	298	158	456	7	2585	65.1	5.7	6.7	3.7	53%	119452	0
	21st	264	147	411	7	2164	58.7	5.3	6.4	3.2	47%	92764	0
	Total	562	305	867	7	4749	123.8	5.5	6.6	3.4	100%	212216	0
MAY	15th	123	185	308	5	1515	61.6	4.9	7.3	3.4	41%	51409	24
	21st	186	184	370	6	1958	61.7	5.3	7.3	3.3	50%	153766	0
	506th	53	10	63	1	458	63.0	7.3	8.4	1.4	9%	48524	0
	Total	362	379	741	7	3931	105.9	5.3	7.4	3.3	100%	253699	24
JUN	15th	213	315	528	9	2692	58.7	5.1	7.4	3.5	38%	63795	95
	21st	212	122	334	6	1909	55.7	5.7	6.9	3.6	24%	140671	0
	506th	207	312	519	9	2665	57.7	5.1	7.5	3.6	38%	70446	18
	Total	632	749	1381	11	7266	125.5	5.3	7.3	3.6	100%	274912	113
JUL	15th	472	241	713	13	4296	54.8	6.0	7.3	3.5	32%	350021	487
	21st	591	128	719	13	4608	55.3	6.4	7.2	3.0	32%	331295	581
	506th	614	183	797	13	5360	61.3	6.7	7.5	4.1	36%	395755	73
	Total	1677	552	2229	17	14264	131.1	6.4	7.3	3.6	100%	1077071	1141
AUG	15th	287	29	316	6	2161	52.7	6.8	7.4	1.5	30%	123683	266
	21st	231	51	282	6	1838	47.0	6.5	7.6	1.6	27%	123420	218
	506th	327	26	353	6	2505	58.8	7.1	7.5	1.9	33%	138486	4
	414th	94	13	107	3	854	35.7	8.0	8.5	3.9	10%	73603	107
	Total	939	119	1058	9	7358	96.2	7.0	7.6	1.9	100%	459192	595

TABULATION OF CUMULATIVE VLR MISSION ACTIVITY


ACTIVITY DATA	15th	21st	506th	414th	TOTAL
Effective Sorties	1,393	1,484	1,201	94	4,172
Non-Effective Sorties	928	632	531	13	2,104
Total Sorties Flown	2,321	2,116	1,732	107	6,276
Total Missions Flown	40	38	29	3	51
Total Hours Flown	13,249	12,477	10,988	854	37,568
Av. Sorties Per Mission	58.0	55.7	59.7	35.7	123.1
Av. Hrs. Per Sortie	5.7	5.9	6.3	8.0	5.9
Percent Total Sorties Flown	37%	34%	28%	1%	100%
Ammunition Expended	708,360	841,916	653,211	73,603	2,277,090
Rockets Expended	872	799	95	107	1,873
Av. Hrs. Per Effective Sortie	7.2	7.1	7.5	8.5	7.3
Av. Hrs. Per Non-Eff. Sortie	3.5	3.1	3.6	3.9	3.4
Effective Hours Flown	10,047	10,502	9,054	803	30,406
Non-Effective Hours Flown	3,202	1,975	1,934	51	7,162
Percent of Total Hrs. Non-Eff.	24%	16%	18%	6%	19%

TABULATION OF CUMULATIVE VLR-BONIN-CAP AND MISC. MISSION ACTIVITY

ACTIVITY DATA		15th	21st	506th	414th	TOTAL
VLR	Eff Sorties	1393	1484	1201	94	4172
	Non-eff Sort	928	632	531	13	2104
	Tot Sorties	2321	2116	1732	107	6276
	Tot Missions	40	38	29	3	51
	Tot Hours	13249	12477	10988	854	37568
BONIN	Eff Sorties	742	508	249	9	1508
	Non-eff Sort	53	40	37	0	130
	Tot Sorties	795	548	286	9	1638
	Tot Missions	92	50	26	3	171
	Tot Hours	1718	1072	615	25	3430
CAP	Eff Sorties	2560	1865	1145	217	5787
	Non-eff Sort	32	97	33	16	178
	Tot Sorties	2592	1962	1178	233	5965
	Tot Hours	4535	3814	2076	542	10967
MISC	Eff Sorties	312	46	53	29	440
	Non-eff Sort	22	1	0	4	27
	Tot Sorties	334	47	53	33	467
	Tot Missions	65	8	9	2	84
	Tot Hours	542	79	56	36	713
GRAND TOTAL	Eff Sorties	5007	3903	2648	349	11907
	Non-eff Sort	1035	770	601	33	2439
	Tot Sorties	6042	4673	3249	382	14346
	Tot Missions	197	96	64	8	306
	Tot Hours	20044	17442	13735	1457	52678

NOTE: Grand Total of Number of Missions flown does not include CAP


VII FIGHTER COMMAND PERCENT OF THE ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED AND DAMAGED AS TO NUMBER RESISTING




RESISTING	125	145	230	206	37	743
DESTROYED & DAMAGED	94	69	106	105	22	396
TOTAL						

VII FIGHTER COMMAND VLR MISSIONS


RATIO ENEMY A/C DESTROYED AND DAMAGED
TO AAF A/C DESTROYED AND DAMAGED



RATIO ENEMY A/C DESTROYED AND DAMAGED
TO AAF A/C DESTROYED




VII FIGHTER COMMAND AVERAGE SORTIES PER VLR MISSION



15 TH FTR GP	65.1	61.6	58.7	54.8	52.7
21 ST FTR GP	58.7	61.7	55.7	55.3	47.0
506 TH FTR GP	—	63.0	57.7	61.3	58.8
414 TH FTR GP	—	—	—	—	35.7
TOTAL	123.8	105.9	125.5	131.1	96.2

VII FIGHTER COMMAND VLR SORTIES BY GROUPS

NO. SORTIES



15TH FTR GP


506TH FTR GP

21ST FTR GP

414TH FTR GP

	15 TH	21 ST	506 TH	414 TH	TOTAL
CUM'L SORTIES	2321	2116	1732	107	6276
% TOTAL SORTIES	37%	34%	28%	1%	100%

% SORTIES ABORTIVE




	APRIL	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUGUST
TOTAL NO. EFF	562	362	632	1677	939
TOT. NO. ABORT	305	379	749	552	119
% ABORTIVE	35%	51%	54%	25%	11%

VII FIGHTER COMMAND

PERCENT OF NON-EFFECTIVE VLR SORTIES

BY REASON




SORTIES FLOWN-6276

NON-EFF SORTIES-2104

33 % SORTIES NON - EFF

VII FIGHTER COMMAND VLR HOURS BY GROUPS

NO. HOURS



15TH FTR GP


506TH FTR GP

21ST FTR GP

414TH FTR GP




	15 TH	21 ST	506 TH	414 TH	TOTAL
CUMULAT. HOURS	13249	12477	10988	854	37568
% TOT. HRS.FLOWN	35%	33%	29%	3%	100%

% ABORTIVE HOURS




	APRIL	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUGUST
TOT.NO.EFF. HOURS	3699	2690	4605	12,277	7135
TOT.NO.ABORT.HRS.	1050	1241	2661	1987	223
%ABORTIVE HRS.	22%	32%	37%	14%	3%

VII FIGHTER COMMAND VLR MISSIONS RATIO OF PILOT LOSSES TO MISSIONS-SORTIES-HOURS




	APRIL	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG	TOTAL
PILOT LOSSES	18	9	28	21	15	91
PER MISSION	2.6	1.3	2.5	1.2	1.7	1.8
PER 100 SORTIES	2.1	1.2	2.0	.9	1.4	1.5
PER 1000 HOURS	3.8	3.3	3.9	1.5	2.0	2.4

VII FIGHTER COMMAND TOTAL COMBAT SORTIES FLOWN




DAILY AVERAGE COMBAT SORTIES FLOWN




VII FIGHTER COMMAND TOTAL PILOT LOSSES

7 MARCH - 14 AUGUST 1945
P-47 & P-51 TYPE AIRCRAFT




15 TH FTR GP	21 ST FTR GP	506 TH FTR GP	414 TH FTR GP	TOTAL
50	31	24	2	107

VII FIGHTER COMMAND
CUMULATIVE AIRCRAFT AND PILOT
LOSS FOR DAY FIGHTER UNITS
7 MAR-14 AUG 1945



VII FIGHTER COMMAND TOTAL GASOLINE CONSUMED PER FIGHTER FLYING HOUR 7 MAR-15 AUG 1945




TOTAL GAS CONSUMED	520,597	572,166	534,163	892,248	1,369,964	744,516
TOTAL HRS. FLOWN	6,847	7,690	7,894	13,769	21,013	9,992

VII FIGHTER COMMAND

GASOLINE CONSUMED PER FLYING HOUR

BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

7 MAR-15 AUG 1945



TOTAL GAS CONSUMED	206,474
TOTAL HOURS FLOWN	1,943

3,604,027
60,428

823,153
4,834

NEUTRALIZATION OF THE BONINS

On 11 March 1945, 16 P-51's of the 15th Fighter Group flew the first mission from Iwo in the campaign to neutralize the Bonins. On 89 days of a total 167 days of operations on Iwo, missions were conducted against targets on Chichi and Haha Jima. These missions were concurrent with the VLR missions being flown against Japan. A total of 171 strikes were made with a command average of 9.6 sorties per mission. Of the missions flown on 89 days against the Bonins, the Command average was 18.4 sorties per day. The cumulative number of sorties flown was 1638, with an average of 8% abortive aircraft.

The primary purpose of these missions was to prevent the enemy from using Susaki airfield on Chichi Jima. In addition to air installations, other targets hit include enemy shipping, radio and radar stations and warehouse storage areas. The value of the strikes were twofold: The enemy suffered damage and was constantly harrassed, and combat pilots found in these missions an invaluable transition between mainland training and the difficult VLR combat mission.


TABULATION OF BONIN MISSION ACTIVITY

	UNITS	EFFECTIVE SORTIES	NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIES	TOTAL SORTIES	TOTAL MISSIONS	TOTAL HOURS	AVERAGE SORTIES PER MISSION	AVERAGE HOURS PER SORTIE	PERCENT TOTAL MISSIONS FLOWN	AMMUNITION EXPENDED	BOMB TONNAGE EXPENDED	ROCKETS EXPENDED
MAY	15th	320	4	324	19	660	17.1	2.0	76%	89,983	126.5	0
	21st	93	1	94	6	196	15.7	2.1	24%	27,687	31.5	0
	Total	413	5	418	25	856	16.7	2.0	100%	117,670	158.0	0
APR	15th	64	37	101	17	191	5.9	1.9	81%	24,242	28.8	0
	21st	58	4	62	4	102	15.5	1.6	19%	8,361	21.0	0
	Total	122	41	163	21	293	7.8	1.8	100%	32,603	49.8	0
Y	15th	91	5	96	18	186	5.3	1.9	56%	29,698	34.0	48
	21st	90	7	97	7	176	13.7	1.8	22%	24,645	33.8	0
	506th	57	29	86	7	188	12.2	2.2	22%	18,603	29.0	0
	Total	238	41	279	32	550	8.7	2.0	100%	72,946	96.8	48
JUN	15th	123	4	127	16	304	7.9	2.3	37%	55,970	45.0	53
	21st	158	26	184	16	376	11.5	2.0	37%	27,134	53.5	206
	506th	130	6	136	11	295	12.4	2.2	26%	73,477	43.0	41
	Total	411	36	447	43	975	10.4	2.2	100%	156,581	141.5	300
JUL	15th	144	3	147	22	377	6.7	2.6	49%	97,824	52.5	128
	21st	77	2	79	12	158	6.6	2.0	27%	19,455	28.5	42
	506th	62	2	64	8	132	8.0	2.1	18%	33,737	22.0	19
	414th	9	0	9	3	25	3.0	2.8	6%	1,180	0	2
	Total	292	7	299	45	692	6.6	2.3	100%	152,196	103.0	191
AUG	15th	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	21st	32	0	32	5	64	6.4	2.0	0	11,800	6.8	48
	506	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	414th	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	32	0	32	5	64	6.4	2.0	0	11,800	6.8	48

TABULATION OF CUMULATIVE BONIN MISSION ACTIVITY

ACTIVITY DATA	15th	21st	506th	414th	TOTAL
Effective Sorties	742	508	249	9	1,508
Non-Effective Sorties	53	40	37	0	130
Total Sorties Flown	795	548	286	9	1,638
Total Missions Flown	92	50	26	3	171
Total Hours Flown	1,718	1,072	615	25	3,430
Av. Sorties Per Mission	8.6	10.1	11.0	3.0	9.6
Av. Hrs. Per Sortie	2.2	2.0	2.2	2.8	2.1
Percent Total Missions Flown	54%	29%	15%	2%	100%
Ammunition Expended	297,717	119,082	125,817	1,180	543,796
Bomb Tonnage Expended	286.8	175.1	94.0	0	555.9
Rockets Expended	229	296	60	2	587


PERCENT OF BONIN MISSIONS FLOWN BY GROUPS



15th FTR GP
 21st FTR GP
 506th FTR GP
 414th FTR GP


15TH	21ST	506TH	414TH	TOTAL
92	50	26	3	171
CUMULATIVE MISSIONS FLOWN				
54 %	29 %	15 %	2 %	100 %
PERCENT OF MISSIONS				
8.6	10.1	11.0	3.0	9.6
AVER. SORTIES PER MISSION				

VII FIGHTER COMMAND BONIN MISSIONS TOTAL HOURS FLOWN BY GROUPS



	15TH	21ST	506TH	414TH	TOTAL
CUMULATIVE HOURS	1718	1072	615	25	3430
% OF TOTAL HRS FLOWN	50%	31%	18%	1%	100%


VII FIGHTER COMMAND PERCENT OF EFFECTIVE AND NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIES BONIN MISSIONS



■ EFFECTIVE SORTIES
▨ NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIES


	15 TH	21 ST	506 TH	414 TH	TOTAL
CUM. EFF. SORTIES	742	508	249	9	1508
CUM. NON - EFF. SORTIES	53	40	37	0	130
PERCENT ABORTIVE	7%	8%	15%	0	9%

VII FIGHTER COMMAND BONIN MISSIONS AVERAGE SORTIES PER MISSION



15TH FTR.GP.	17.1	5.9	5.3	7.9	6.7	—
21ST FTR.GP.	15.7	15.5	13.7	11.5	6.6	6.4
506TH FTR.GP.	—	—	12.2	12.4	8.0	—
414TH FTR.GP.	—	—	—	—	3.0	—
COMMAND AV.	16.7	7.8	8.7	10.4	6.6	6.4

VII FIGHTER COMMAND BONIN MISSIONS TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN



15 TH FTR.GP.	324	101	96	127	147	—
21 ST FTR.GP.	94	62	97	184	79	32
506 TH FTR.GP.	—	—	86	136	64	—
414 TH FTR.GP.	—	—	—	—	9	—
TOTAL	418	163	279	447	299	32


TABULATION OF DAY CAP ACTIVITY

	UNITS	EFFECTIVE SORTIES	NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIES	TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN	TOTAL HOURS FLOWN	PERCENT TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN	TOTAL AV. DAILY HOURS FLOWN	AV. HOURS FLWN. PER SORTIE	PERCENT TOTAL HOURS FLOWN	TOTAL AV. DAILY SORTIES FLOWN
MAR	15th	963	2	965	1760	86%	70.4	1.8	82%	38.2
	21st	149	11	160	377	14%	53.9	2.4	18%	22.9
	Total	1112	13	1125	2137	100%	124.3	1.9	100%	61.1
APR	15th	439	8	447	731	52%	24.4	1.6	49%	14.9
	21st	390	19	409	764	48%	25.5	1.9	51%	13.6
	Total	829	27	856	1495	100%	49.9	1.7	100%	28.5
MAY	15th	259	0	259	411	37%	13.3	1.6	33%	8.4
	21st	230	17	247	477	35%	15.4	1.9	38%	8.0
	506th	200	2	202	353	28%	22.1	1.7	29%	12.6
	Total	689	19	708	1241	100%	50.8	1.8	100%	29.0
JUN	15th	308	8	316	566	28%	18.9	1.8	27%	10.5
	21st	471	24	495	940	44%	31.3	1.9	45%	16.2
	506th	317	9	326	578	28%	19.3	1.8	28%	10.9
	Total	1096	41	1137	2084	100%	69.5	1.8	100%	37.6
JUL	15th	416	13	429	766	30%	24.7	1.8	29%	13.8
	21st	441	20	461	906	32%	29.2	2.0	35%	14.9
	506th	525	16	541	953	38%	30.7	1.8	36%	17.5
	Total	1382	49	1431	2625	100%	84.7	1.8	100%	46.2
AUG	15th	175	1	176	301	25%	15.1	1.7	22%	8.8
	21st	184	6	190	350	27%	17.5	1.8	25%	9.5
	506th	103	6	109	192	15%	9.6	1.8	14%	5.5
	414th	217	16	233	542	33%	27.1	2.3	39%	11.7
	Total	679	29	708	1385	100%	69.3	1.9	100%	35.5

TABULATION OF CUMULATIVE DAY COMBAT AIR PATROL ACTIVITY

ACTIVITY DATA	15th	21st	506th	414th	TOTAL
Effective Sorties	2560	1865	1145	217	5787
Non-Effective Sorties	32	97	33	16	178
Total Sorties Flown	2592	1962	1178	233	5965
Total Hours Flown	4535	3814	2076	542	10967
Percent Total Sorties Flown	43%	33%	20%	4%	100%
Total Av. Daily Hrs. Flown	27.2	25.6	21.4	27.1	101.3
Av. Hrs. Flown Per Sortie	1.7	1.9	1.8	2.3	1.8
Percent Total Hrs. Flown	41%	35%	19%	5%	100%
Total Av. Daily Sorties Flown	15.5	13.2	11.1	11.7	51.5


VII FIGHTER COMMAND DAY CAP SORTIES FLOWN 7 MARCH TO 20 AUGUST 1945




PERCENT TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN								TOTAL
15th FTR.GP.	86 %	52 %	37 %	28 %	30 %	25 %	43 %	
21st FTR.GP.	14 %	48 %	35 %	44 %	32 %	27 %	33 %	
506th FTR.GP.	—	—	28 %	28 %	38 %	15 %	20 %	
414th FTR.GP.	—	—	—	—	—	33 %	4 %	


15th FTR GP
 21st FTR GP
 506th FTR GP
 414th FTR GP

VII FIGHTER COMMAND AVERAGE DAILY CAP SORTIES FLOWN



VII FIGHTER COMMAND DAY CAP FLYING TIME 7 MAR-20 AUG 1945





TABULATION OF CUMULATIVE NIGHT COMBAT AIR PATROL ACTIVITY

ACTIVITY DATA	548th	549th	TOTAL
Effective Sorties	275	1002	1277
Non-Effective Sorties	28	77	105
Total Sorties Flown	303	1079	1382
Total Hours Flown	1116	2957	4073
Percent Total Sorties Flown	22%	76%	100%
Total Av. Daily Hours Flown	17.7	19.5	37.2
Av. Hrs. Flown Per Sortie	3.7	2.7	2.9
Percent Total Hrs. Flown	27%	73%	100%
Total Av. Daily Sorties Flown	4.8	7.1	11.9

**TABULATION OF NIGHT COMBAT
AIR PATROL ACTIVITY
7 MARCH TO 20 AUGUST 1945**

	UNIT	EFFECTIVE SORTIES	NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIES	TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN	TOTAL HOURS FLOWN	PERCENT TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN	TOTAL AV DAILY HOURS FLOWN	AV HRS FLOWN PER SORTIE	PERCENT TOTAL HOURS FLOWN	TOTAL AV DAILY SORTIES FLOWN
MAR	548th	165	19	184	679	72%	27.2	3.7	74%	7.5
	549th	62	11	73	236	28%	23.6	3.2	26%	7.3
	Total	227	30	257	915	100%	50.8	3.6	100%	14.8
APR	548th	107	9	116	430	38%	14.3	3.7	44%	3.9
	549th	170	17	187	540	62%	18.0	2.9	56%	6.2
	Total	277	26	303	970	100%	32.3	3.2	100%	10.1
MAY	548th	3	0	3	7	3%	.9	2.3	3%	.4
	549th	102	0	102	250	97%	8.1	2.5	97%	3.3
	Total	105	0	105	257	100%	9.0	2.4	100%	3.7
JUN	549th	242	20	262	638	-	21.3	2.4	-	8.7
JUL	549th	291	19	310	891	-	28.7	2.9	-	10.0
AUG	549th	135	10	145	402	-	20.1	2.8	-	7.3

NIGHT INTRUDER MISSIONS TO BONINS

ACTIVITY DATA	MARCH	APRIL		GRAND TOTAL		
	549th	548th	549th	548th	549th	TOTAL
Effective Sorties	4	39	26	39	30	69
Non-Effective Sorties	0	0	2	0	2	2
Total Sorties	4	39	28	39	32	71
Total Hours Flown	9	94	62	94	71	165
Bombs Dropped (500 lbs)	8	78	53	78	61	139
50 Cal. Expenditures	1750	6085	1810	6085	3560	9645
20 MM. Expenditures	1222	6895	1503	6895	2725	9620

TOTAL ENEMY LOSSES

	548th	549th	TOTAL
Destroyed In Air	2	1	3
Probably Destroyed In Air	1	0	1
Total	3	1	4

TOTAL P-61 PLANE AND CREW LOSSES

	548th	549th	TOTAL
Planes Destroyed	5	4	9
Planes Damaged	6	2	8
Total Destroyed & Damaged	11	6	17
Pilots Killed	1	3	4
Radar Observers Killed	1	3	4
Gunners Killed	0	3	3
Total Killed	2	9	11

VII FIGHTER COMMAND

P-61 NIGHT CAP SORTIES FLOWN





7 MARCH TO 20 AUGUST 1945

SORTIES



	MARCH	APRIL	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUGUST	TOTAL
548TH N.F. SQ.	184	116	3	—	—	—	303
549TH N.F. SQ.	73	187	102	262	310	145	1079
TOTAL	257	303	105	262	310	145	1382


VII FIGHTER COMMAND P-61 CUMULATIVE HOUR AND SORTIE DATA



VII FIGHTER COMMAND

P-61 NIGHT CAP HOURS FLOWN

HOURS
1000







	MARCH	APRIL	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUGUST	TOTAL
548TH N.F. SQ.	679	430	7	—	—	—	1116
549TH N.F. SQ.	236	540	250	638	891	402	2957
TOTAL	915	970	257	638	891	402	4073

TABULATION OF MISC. SHORT MISSION ACTIVITY

	UNITS	EFFECTIVE SORTIES	NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIES	TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN	TOTAL MISSIONS FLOWN	TOTAL HOURS FLOWN	AVERAGE SORTIES PER MISSIONS	AVERAGE HOURS PER SORTIES
MAR	15th	178	19	197	37	322	5.3	1.6
APR	15th	37	0	37	7	45	5.3	1.2
	21st	5	0	5	2	38	2.5	7.6
	Total	42	0	42	9	83	4.7	2.0
MAY	15th	40	0	40	9	79	4.4	2.0
	21st	9	1	10	1	7	10.0	.7
	506th	8	0	8	2	16	4.0	2.0
	Total	57	1	58	12	102	4.8	1.8
JUN	15th	40	3	43	8	51	5.4	1.2
	21st	16	0	16	2	17	8.0	1.1
	506th	24	0	24	3	18	8.0	.8
	Total	80	3	83	13	86	6.4	1.0
JUL	15th	17	0	17	4	45	4.3	2.6
	21st	16	0	16	3	17	5.3	1.1
	506th	21	0	21	4	22	5.3	1.1
	Total	54	0	54	11	84	4.9	1.6
AUG	414th	29	4	33	2	36	16.5	1.1

TABULATION OF CUMULATIVE MISC SHORT MISSION ACTIVITY

ACTIVITY DATA	15th	21st	506th	414th	TOTAL
Effective Sorties	312	46	53	29	440
Non-Effective Sorties	22	1	0	4	27
Total Sorties Flown	334	47	53	33	467
Total Missions Flown	65	8	9	2	84
Total Hours Flown	542	79	56	36	713
Av. Sorties Per Mission	5.1	5.9	5.9	16.5	5.6
Av. Hours Per Sortie	1.6	1.7	1.1	1.1	1.5



SUPPLY & MAINTENANCE

SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE.

(The Iwo Operation)

Supply and maintenance activities in VII Fighter Command operations gave rise to a number of complex problems. Some of these were the movement of aircraft forward, aircraft modifications, maintenance, quartermaster operations and ordnance and engineer functions.

1. Movement of Aircraft Forward.

The original plan had been to catapult the aircraft from escort carriers either at Saipan or at Iwo Jima. The shortage of escort carriers necessitated dead loading the aircraft in order to carry a greater number on a single escort carrier. The aircraft then had to be unloaded at Guam by lighter, towed to Orote Field to be serviced by depot personnel, and flown to Saipan to await the ferry flight to Iwo Jima. These loading changes brought about additional complications. No personnel would be available to accompany reserve aircraft of the tactical groups. Maintenance and service facilities had to be set up for the air echelons remaining on Oahu after service personnel had departed. It was necessary for the maintenance personnel of one service group and one tactical group to maintain air echelons of two tactical groups for several weeks on Iwo Jima.

2. Aircraft Modifications.

Many important modifications were necessary to convert the P-51D, as it was used in the ETO, to long over water missions in the Pacific. The first of these was IFF, imperative for Pacific Operations. In spite of the fact that the Air Technical Service Command thought the installation either too difficult or impossible, a series of experiments on Oahu resulted in a successful installation. At the same time the IFF was installed, the pyrotechnic pistol and the BC-1206 Detrola radio were removed.

Important as well was the installation of the AN/ARA-8 homing adapter, chiefly accomplished under very difficult conditions on Iwo Jima.

Operations with 110 gallon drop tanks left the aircraft with a minimal fuel reserve returning to base. A change was then made to 165 gallon tanks, and for additional reasons. The extra fuel permitted better operating power settings, allowed the fighters an opportunity to climb over or find a gap through weather fronts, gave longer time to escort, a longer period over the target area for selection of targets, gave the lifeguard submarine cover more time aloft. This necessitated the design and fabrication of a suitable installation kit for carrying these larger tanks.

K-14 computing gun sights were also installed. An emergency coolant shutter actuator was necessary to prevent the aircraft from being forced down by a failure of the coolant

shutter motor or thermostat. The most recent modifications were the installation of zero length rail rocket launchers.

3. Maintenance.

Spark plugs here, as in the ETO, proved a source of trouble. Long periods of operation at minimum cruise power settings caused excessive plug fouling, and extra maintenance and frequent inspection were necessary to avoid engines cutting out. Dust particles have also contributed to this problem. The solution to this problem was to change all plugs after 2 missions and to check them constantly. Water and moisture plus dirt have clogged carburetor impact tubes and blanketed radiators, giving rise again to engine cut outs.


Extreme corrosive conditions, aggravated by the lack of fresh water and cleaning facilities, caused malfunction of hydraulic mechanisms. Such corrosion attacks the fuselage, control surfaces and cables, and electrical equipment of the aircraft.

Certain parts were critical. Carburetors on new engines had to be modified, and new carburetors needed flow checking. Magneto points, magneto distributor rotors, magneto contact brushes, carburetor floats, spark plugs and flaps were difficult to obtain. New engines were found to be out of valve timing as much as eight or ten degrees.

5. Quartermaster.

Operations were hampered by three major shortages: lack of sufficient cold storage space, insufficient tentage, and inadequate typewriter repair facilities. Messes were handicapped because cold storage was not available, and fresh meats and fruits could not be stored. Organizations arrived with no tentage, and heavy tentage losses made for a critical situation.

VII FIGHTER COMMAND DAILY AVERAGE OF AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED AND PERCENT OPERATIONAL BY MONTHS P-51 & P-47 AIRCRAFT




VII FIGHTER COMMAND

DAILY AVERAGE PERCENT OF AIRCRAFT


OPERATIONAL BY MONTHS

P-51 & P-47 AIRCRAFT





VII FIGHTER COMMAND DAILY AVERAGE OF AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED AND PERCENT OPERATIONAL BY MONTHS P-51 & P-47 AIRCRAFT




VII FIGHTER COMMAND



DAILY AVERAGE PERCENT OF AIRCRAFT

OPERATIONAL BY MONTHS


P-51 & P-47 AIRCRAFT



VII FIGHTER COMMAND ASSIGNED AND ATTACHED STRENGTH BY MONTHS 31 MARCH-20 AUGUST 1945




VII FIGHTER COMMAND DAILY AVERAGE OF PILOTS ASSIGNED AND AVAILABLE P-51 AND P-47





VII FIGHTER COMMAND

TOTAL BATTLE AND NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES

FEB 20-AUG 15 1945



15



MISCELLANEOUS

WEATHER PROBLEM

(The Iwo Operation)


One of the primary limiting factors of fighter operations from Iwo was bad weather. Military weather observers have phrased the situation in semi-technical language:

"In general, the area between the Pacific high pressure cell and the migratory high cell coming off the Asiatic continent (i.e. the area of fronts and bad weather) was south of Iwo Jima in March and the first part of April; then began to move farther North until in Mid-May the fronts were coming directly over Iwo. The frontal area continued to move toward Japan until by the end of June it was over the southern coasts of Japan. In July and August the frontal area remained, on the average, over the central portion of the Japanese Islands, with a slight oscillation between the North and South Coasts. A few troughs aloft, lines of convergence, and the proximity of several tropical storms were the only causes of weather over Iwo in July and August."

Translated into terms of the effect of weather on the tactics of the Fighter Command, the language of the weather observers indicates numerous sustained periods of hampering weather conditions.


During the period in which 51 missions were flown against the Japanese Empire, 20 missions that were scheduled, were cancelled or postponed because of bad weather. Of the 51 missions that actually took off, 9 were non-effective because of weather. The factor of weather was obviously of basic importance in tactics.

VII FIGHTER COMMAND PERCENT VLR MISSIONS CANCELLED BY WEATHER



NO. MISSIONS SCHEDULED	8	13	18	23	9	71
NO. MISSIONS CANCELLED	1	6	7	6	0	20
PERCENT CANCELLED	13%	46%	39%	26%	0	28%

VLR EFFECTIVE VS NON-EFFECTIVE MISSIONS DUE TO WEATHER



EFFECTIVE	6	5	6	15	9	41
NON-EFFECTIVE	* 1	2	5	2	0	10

 EFFECTIVE MISSIONS

 NON-EFFECTIVE MISSIONS

* MISSION NON-EFFECTIVE - LATE IN MEETING BOMBERS.

AIR SEA RESCUE

(The Iwo Operation)

Upon the arrival of VII Fighter Command at Iwo Jima, tentative plans had been set up to provide Air Sea Rescue facilities for fighter missions to the Bonin Islands, coordinated fighter-bomber missions and independent fighter missions to the Japanese Empire. As problems arose and were solved, progressively more efficient systems were introduced until during the last two months of the Aerial Offensive against the Japanese Empire a very adequate system of Air Sea Rescue was developed and in use from June 1, 1945, until the present.

From 7 March to 15 July the Fighter Command consisted of three Groups of P-51 Mustangs. This was increased by the arrival of the 414th Group equipped with P-47 Thunderbolts, to four fighter groups. All of the Groups flew missions against the Bonin Islands and the Empire until the last combat mission on 14 August. Therefore it was possible to put from 50 to 250 fighter planes in the air for combat missions.

That this would be possible was realized by the A.S.R. Unit Marianas and definite routes to the Empire were established with a standardized system of A.S.R. stations located equidistant along each route. As it finally evolved there were seven routes to the Empire with a minimum of five A.S.R. stations from Iwo to Japan along each route and covering an average distance of 1500 mile round trips, all over water.

The simplest method of outlining how A.S.R. from Iwo operated would be to follow the step by step planning and progress of, for example, an independent fighter mission to the Empire. Let us assume that the command decision has been made to strafe airfields in the Kobe-Osaka Area of Japan with a maximum effort, i.e., all four Groups participating.

On the track "Kobe-Green" (the selected route) there were five A.S.R. stations equidistant from Iwo to Japan with one submarine on each of the three upper stations and one destroyer on each of the two lower stations. The A.S.R. plan would be to provide cover for the destroyers and surfaced submarines during the time the fighter planes passed over each station so that any pilot in trouble could bail-out as near as possible to one of the stations. Then the nearest aircover "Dumbo" would search and locate him and direct the destroyer or submarine to rescue him.

A.S.R. stations would be set up as follows: At the first station the fighters would pass enroute to the Empire would be a destroyer; at the second station, a destroyer and "Dumbo" airplane; at the third station, a surfaced submarine, at the fourth station, a surfaced submarine, and at the fifth station (called the Rally Point) would be a surfaced submarine about ten miles off the Japanese coast covered by two Dumbos, a B-29 and B-17. As the strike force passed this Rally Point station a flight of four fighters would drop out and remain with the

two Dumbos and the submarine to protect them until the last of the strike force had returned and headed back for Iwo. In addition to the two Dumbo airplanes and four fighter planes over this submarine the twelve B-29's that navigated the four fighter groups to the Kobe Area would return and circle over it also.

As the returning strike force started to arrive over the Rally Point single B-29's would be dispatched with fifteen to twenty fighters along the track back to Iwo. Hence, as soon as sufficient numbers of fighter planes reached the Rally Point, single B-29's would be contacted and would navigate them home until all of the fighters and B-29's were enroute to Iwo.

As is evident the Rally Point submarine and Dumbo were busiest. On almost every mission there would be from one to two fighter pilots "bail-out" somewhere near the Rally Point submarine since they would just about be able to reach that point if their planes had been hit by flak. When the last of the fighters had reached the Rally Point the submarine cover flight would "secure" the submarine if there were no rescues or searches in progress and return also.


On the track back to Iwo the first B-29 with its fighters would find these facilities at each station: at station four there would be the same surfaced submarine as on the route up but now covered by a Dumbo; at station two would be the same Destroyer now covered by a Dumbo, although not the same Dumbo that was there for the flight to the Empire six hours earlier; at station one would be the same Destroyer now covered by a Dumbo. When the fighters started to approach Iwo the A.S.R. Fighter Command would have amphibious vehicles (Dukws) stationed on various beaches in order to rescue any pilot whose plane might run out of fuel at the very last minute.

On the flight back to Iwo one of the two destroyers on station generally effected about one rescue per mission since usually one fighter plane would have had to use more fuel in combat than planned, and the pilot would have to decide how far along the track he could go before having to "bail-out" over one of the A.S.F. stations.

It is surprising how well this system of A.S.R. stations functioned. The communications system was worked out so that the fighters, navigational B-29's, Destroyers, and submarines all had one radio frequency in common. This frequency was set aside for A.S.R. emergencies only. The fighters also could talk to the B-29's on another frequency, and the B-29's could talk to the Dumbos, Destroyers, and submarine on one other voice frequency and two other C.W. frequencies. The Dumbos and Navigational B-29's were in direct communication with the Air Sea Rescue Unit at Iwo during the entire mission. Also there were follow-up transmissions from the submarines and destroyers after engaging in an Air Sea Rescue operation informing the Iwo A.S.R. Unit of the results of the searches and rescues.

AIR-SEA RESCUE ACTIVITIES

PERCENT OF PILOTS RESCUED



TOTAL

NUMBER OF PILOTS FAILING TO RETURN	3	20	17	39	50	33	162
NUMBER DEAD AND NO RESCUE POSSIBLE	2	8	9	5	22	11	57
NUMBER KNOWN DOWN AT SEA	1	12	8	34	28	22	105
NUMBER RESCUED	—	3	5	9	24	16	57
% RESCUED OF PILOTS FAILING TO RETURN	—	15%	29%	23%	48%	49%	35%
% RESCUED OF PILOTS KNOWN DOWN AT SEA	—	25%	63%	26%	86%	73%	54%

2-12-83 157

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS

The rate of accidents throughout the Iwo operation was a commentary on the primitive conditions of the Island. For long periods, runways were in a state of disrepair. At the beginning, Jap artillery scarred the surface of the fields. Concurrent with the enemy action, and for months thereafter, great clouds of dust were a standard part of each takeoff and landing. Tropical storms were responsible for erosion of the soil and rivers of water across fields.

From the inception of operations to 15 August 1945, the number of accidents sustained totaled 178, with 30 fatalities. These accidents resulted in the destruction of 103 aircraft, and damage of 102.

The command average for the entire period was 2.44 accidents per thousand flying hours.

TOTAL AND FATAL AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS BY ORGANIZATIONS MARCH THROUGH 15 AUGUST 1945

ORGANIZATION	March Thru June		July		To Include 15 August		Total	
	TOT.	FAT.	TOT.	FAT.	TOT.	FAT.	TOT.	FAT.
45th Fighter Squadron	17	3	5	-	1	1	23	4
47th Fighter Squadron	20	3	6	2	2	-	28	5
78th Fighter Squadron	15	2	2	-	2	-	19	2
TOTAL 15TH GROUP	52	8	13	2	5	1	70	11
46th Fighter Squadron	13	1	6	-	2	-	21	1
72nd Fighter Squadron	12	2	8	-	1	-	21	2
531st Fighter Squadron	11	-	5	2	1	1	17	3
TOTAL 21ST GROUP	36	3	19	2	4	1	59	6
457th Fighter Squadron	4	1	2	-	1	-	7	1
458th Fighter Squadron	6	1	1	-	-	-	7	1
462nd Fighter Squadron	6	2	3	-	-	-	9	2
TOTAL 506TH GROUP	16	4	6	-	1	-	23	4
413th Fighter Squadron	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	-
437th Fighter Squadron	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	-
456th Fighter Squadron	-	-	-	-	*3	*1	3	1
TOTAL 414TH GROUP	-	-	-	-	7	1	7	1
548th Night Fighter Sq	9	2	-	-	-	-	9	2
549th Night Fighter Sq	3	-	2	6	1	-	6	6
386th Service Group	1	-	1	-	-	-	2	-
Det 4th E. R. Squadron	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	-
TOTAL	117	17	43	10	18	3	178	30

* Includes 1 accident not included in July Cumulative Figures.

TOTAL AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS BY ALL HOURS FLOWN AND ORGANIZATION MARCH THROUGH 15 AUG 1945

UNIT	Hours Flown	% of Total Hours Flown	Number Accidents	% of Total Accidents	Accidents per 1000 Hrs.
45th Fighter Sq	8479	11.6	23	12.9	2.7
47th Fighter Sq	7982	10.9	28	15.7	3.5
78th Fighter Sq	8615	11.8	19	10.7	2.2
TOTAL 15th Group	25076	34.3	70	39.3	2.8
Headquarters	* 843	1.2	-	-	-
46th Fighter Sq	6657	9.1	21	11.8	3.2
72nd Fighter Sq	6255	8.6	21	11.8	3.4
531st Fighter Sq	6450	8.8	17	9.6	2.6
TOTAL 21st Group	20205	27.7	59	33.2	2.9
457th Fighter Sq	5171	7.1	7	3.9	1.4
458th Fighter Sq	5382	7.4	7	3.9	1.3
462nd Fighter Sq	5418	7.4	9	5.1	1.7
TOTAL 506th Group	15971	21.9	23	12.9	1.4
413th Fighter Sq	604	.8	2	1.1	3.3
437th Fighter Sq	644	.9	2	1.1	3.1
456th Fighter Sq	695	1.0	3	1.7	4.3
TOTAL 414th Group	1943	2.7	7	3.9	3.6
548th N.F. Sq	1619	2.3	9	5.1	5.6
549th N.F. Sq	3606	4.9	6	3.4	1.7
363rd Service Group	593	.8	-	-	-
386th Service Group	187	.3	2	1.1	10.7
Hq & Hq Sq, VII Ftr Comd	781	1.0	-	-	-
Det. 4th E.R. Sq	2808	3.8	2	1.1	.7
9th Radar Cal. Det.	228	.3	-	-	-
TOTAL	73017	100.	178	100.	2.4

* 21st Fighter Group Flew as a single detachment in March. Since flying hours cannot be credited to individual squadrons, all hours for March are assigned to Hq, 21st Ftr Gp, for purposes of this report.

TOTAL AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS BY INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED AND INJURY SUSTAINED MARCH THROUGH 15 AUG 1945

ORGANIZATION	No. of Indv'l Invol'd	Fatal	Major Injur- ies	Minor Injur- ies	None	% Indv'l Invol'd	% Fatal	% Major Inj's	% Minor Inj's	% None
15th Ftr Gp	73	11	3	4	55	32	34	34	18	33
21st Ftr Gp	63	8	3	14	38	27	25	33	61	23
506th Ftr Gp	25	4	2	1	18	11	13	22	4	11
414th Ftr Gp	8	1	1	3	3	3	3	11	13	2
548th N.F. Sq	25	2	-	1	22	11	6	-	4	13
549th N.F. Sq	16	6	-	-	10	7	19	-	-	6
4th E.R.S.	16	-	-	-	16	7	-	-	-	10
386th Sv Gp	4	-	-	-	4	2	-	-	-	2
TOTAL	230	32	9	23	166	100	100	100	100	100

TOTAL AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS BY CAUSE AND ORGANIZATION MARCH THROUGH 15 AUG 1945

ORGANIZATION	Pilot Error	Engine Failure	Mat'l Failure	Weather	Enemy Action	Misc.	Total
15th Ftr Gp	29	5	28	1	2	5	70
21st Ftr Gp	22	17	11	1	1	7	59
506th Ftr Gp	6	5	7	1	1	3	23
414th Ftr Gp	1	1	3	-	-	2	7
548th N.F. Sq	2	-	1	5	-	1	9
549th N.F. Sq	-	1	2	1	-	2	6
4th E.R.S.	-	-	-	-	-	2	2
386th Sv Gp	-	1	1	-	-	-	2
TOTAL	60	30	53	9	4	*22	178

* 1-Prop wash, 4-Runway, 6-Fuel Shortage, 9-Unknown, 1-hit by target cable, 1-sea landing.

TOTAL AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS BY TYPE OF ACCIDENT AND ORGANIZATION MARCH THROUGH 15 AUG 1945

ORGANIZATION	LAND- ING	TAKE- OFF	CRAS- HED	TAXI- ING	STRUCK OBJECT			TOTAL
					A/C in Air	A/C on Ground	Object on Gr.	
15th Ftr Gp	35	9	13	10	1	2	-	70
21st Ftr Gp	17	16	16	6	1	1	2	59
506th Ft. Gp	10	4	5	-	3	-	*1	23
414th Ftr Gp	3	-	3	1	-	-	-	7
548th N.F. Sq	5	-	2	2	-	-	-	9
549th N.F. Sq	2	1	3	-	-	-	-	6
4th E.R.S.	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2
386th Sv Gp	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	2
TOTAL	73	31	44	19	5	3	*3	178

* Includes Gunnery Cable Struck in Air.

TOTAL AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS BY ALL HOURS FLOWN AND TYPE AND MODEL OF AIRCRAFT INVOLVED MARCH THROUGH 15 AUG 1945

TYPE & MODEL	HOURS FLOWN	% OF TOTAL HRS. FLOWN	NO. OF ACCIDENTS	% OF TOTAL ACCIDENTS	ACCIDENTS PER 1000 HRS.
P-51	61211	83.7	153	86	2.50
P-61	5223	7.2	16	9	3.06
P-47	1948	2.6	7	4	3.59
CB-24D	(1) 284	.4	-	-	-
CB-25G	50	.1	-	-	-
B-17G	1888	2.6	-	-	-
B-24J	(2) 661	.9	-	-	-
OA-10A	920	1.3	2	1	2.17
C-47	801	1.1	-	-	-
A-26C	31	.1	-	-	-
TOTAL	73017	100.	178	100	2.44

(1) CB-24D Salvaged & replaced by CB-24L.

(2) Includes B-24M.

TOTAL & FATAL AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS BY TYPE & MODEL OF AIRCRAFT INVOLVED

MARCH THROUGH 15 AUGUST 1945

TYPE & MODEL	MAR THRU JUN		JULY		AUGUST		TOTALS	
	TOT.	FAT.	TOT.	FAT.	TOT.	FAT.	TOT.	FAT.
P-51	105	15	38	4	10	2	153	21
P-61	12	2	3	6	1	-	16	8
P-47	-	-	-	-	7	1	7	1
OA-10A	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	-
TOTAL	117	17	43	10	18	3	178	30

TOTAL AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS BY CAUSE AND TYPE AND MODEL AIRCRAFT

MARCH THROUGH 15 AUGUST 1945

TYPE & MODEL	PILOT ERROR	ENGINE FAILURE	MAT'L FAILURE	WEATHER	ENEMY ACTION	MISC	TOTAL
P-51	57	27	47	3	4	15	153
P-61	2	2	3	6	-	3	16
P-47	1	1	3	-	-	2	7
OA-10A	-	-	-	-	-	2	2
TOTAL	60	30	53	9	4	22	178

* Includes following causes: 1-Prop wash, 4-Runway, 6-Fuel Shortage, 1-hit by Target Cable, 9-Unknown, 1-damaged in sea landing.

TOTAL AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS BY AIRCRAFT INVOLVED AND DAMAGE SUSTAINED

MARCH THROUGH 15 AUGUST 1945

ORGANIZATION	No. of Acft Invol'd	Tot. Loss	Major Dam- age	Minor Dam- age	% Acft Invol'd	% Total Loss	% Major Damgd	% Minor Damgd
15th Ftr Gp	89	39	34	16	43	38	46	55
21st Ftr Gp	62	34	25	3	31	32	33	10
506th Ftr Gp	25	15	7	3	13	15	10	10
414th Ftr Gp	7	4	3	-	3	4	4	-
548th N.F. Sq	11	5	-	6	5	5	-	21
549th N.F. Sq	7	3	4	-	3	3	7	-
4th E.R.S.	2	2	-	-	1	2	-	-
386th Sv Gp	2	(1)1	-	(2)1	1	1	-	4
TOTAL	205	103	73	29	100	100	100	100

(1) P-61

(2) P-51

TOTAL AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS BY TYPE OF MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

MARCH THROUGH 15 AUGUST 1945

ORGANIZATION	VLR	Short Range	CAP	Alert Scramble	Test	Training	Weather	Admin	TOTAL
15th Ftr Gp	26	6	16	1	8	12	-	1	70
21st Ftr Gp	26	5	16	4	5	2	-	1	59
506th Ftr Gp	12	-	4	-	5	1	1	-	23
414th Ftr Gp	2	-	3	-	1	1	-	-	7
548th NF Sq	-	2	7	-	-	-	-	-	9
549th NF Sq	-	2	2	-	1	-	1	-	6
4th E.R.S.	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2
386th Sv Gp	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2
TOTAL	66	15	48	7	22	16	2	2	178

TOTAL AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS BY TYPE OF MISSION

MARCH THROUGH 15 AUGUST 1945

MISSION	NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS	PERCENT OF TOTAL
VLR	66	37.1
SHORT RANGE	15	8.4
CAP	48	27.0
ALERT SCRAMBLE	7	3.9
TEST	22	12.4
TRAINING	16	9.0
WEATHER	2	1.1
ADMINISTRATIVE	2	1.1
TOTAL	178	100

TOTAL ACCIDENTS BY TYPE OF ACCIDENT AND TYPE AND MODEL AIRCRAFT MARCH THROUGH 15 AUGUST 1945

TYPE & MODEL	LANDING	TAKE-OFF	CRASHED	STRUCK OBJECT			TAXIING	TOTAL
				A/C in Air	A/C on Ground	Object On Grnd		
P-51	62	29	34	5	3	*3	16	152
P-61	8	2	5	-	-	-	2	17
P-47	3	-	3	-	-	-	1	7
OA-10A	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2
TOTAL	73	31	44	5	3	*3	19	178

* Includes Gunnery Cable struck in air.

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS - MISCELLANEOUS DATA MARCH THROUGH 15 AUGUST 1945

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL INVOLVED - TOTAL	230
NUMBER IN AIRCRAFT	226
NUMBER OTHERS INVOLVED	*4
NUMBER OF PARACHUTES USED (COMBAT & ACCDT)	75
NUMBER OF PARACHUTES USED SUCCESSFULLY	63

(COMBAT & ACCIDENT)

- * Occupant of Jeep killed in accident of 17 May.
- 1 Member of AAA AW Bn killed in accident of 19 June.
- 1 Member of AAA AW Bn burned in accident of 19 June.
- 1 Member of MP struck and injured in accident of 2 August.

PROPERTY OF (1980)
WALTER J. HUTENGS
WOODSTOCK VLY, CT.
06282

DISTRIBUTION

File
1 Sgt Maj
1 46th
1 72nd
1 531st